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Abstract—In this paper, detection of deception attack on deep
neural network (DNN) based image classification in autonomous
and cyber-physical systems is considered. Several studies have
shown the vulnerability of DNN to malicious deception attacks.
In such attacks, some or all pixel values of an image are modified
by an external attacker, so that the change is almost invisible to
human eye but significant enough for a DNN-based classifier to
misclassify it. This paper first proposes a novel pre-processing
technique that facilitates detection of such modified images under
any DNN-based image classifier as well as attacker model. The
proposed pre-processing algorithm involves a certain combination
of principal component analysis (PCA)-based decomposition of
the image, and random perturbation based detection to reduce
computational complexity. Next, an adaptive version of this
algorithm is proposed where a random number of perturbations
are chosen adaptively using a doubly-threshold policy, and the
threshold values are learnt via stochastic approximation in order
to minimize the expected number of perturbations subject to
constraints on the false alarm and missed detection probabilities.
Numerical experiments show that the proposed detection scheme
outperform a competing algorithm while achieving reasonably
low computational complexity.
Index Terms—Image classification, Adversarial image, Deep
neural network, Deception attack, Attack detection, Cyber-
physical systems, Autonomous vehicles, stochastic approximation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently there have been significant research interest in
cyber-physical systems (CPS) that connect the cyber world
and the physical world, via integration of sensing, control,
communication, computation and learning. Popular CPS ap-
plications include networked monitoring of industry, disaster
management, smart grids, intelligent transportation systems,
networked surveillance, etc. One important component of
future intelligent transportation systems is autonomous vehi-
cle. It is envisioned that future autonomous vehicles will be
equipped with high-quality cameras, whose images will be
classified by a DNN-based classifier for object detection and
recognition, in order to facilitate an informed maneuvering
decision by the controller or autopilot. Clearly, vehicular
safety in such cases is highly sensitive to image classification;
any mistake in object detection or classification can lead to
accidents. In the context of surveillance or security systems,
adversarial images can greatly endanger human and system
security.
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Over the last few years, several studies have suggested
that the DNN-based image classifier is highly vulnerable to
deception attack [2], [3]. In fact, with the emergence of
internet-of-things (IoT) providing an IP address to all gadgets
including cameras, the autonomous vehicles will become more
vulnerable to such attacks [4]. Hackers can easily tamper
with the pixel values (see Figure 1) or the image data sent
by the camera to the classifier. In a similar way, networked
surveillance cameras will also become vulnerable to such
malicious attacks.
In order to address the above challenge, we propose a new
class of algorithms for adversarial image detection. Our first
perturbation-based algorithm PERT performs PCA (Prinicipal
Component Analysis) on clean image data set, and detects an
adversary by perturbing a test image in the spectral domain
along certain carefully chosen coordinates obtained from PCA.
Next, its adaptive version APERT chooses the number of
perturbations adaptively in order to minimize the expected
number of perturbations subject to constraints on the false
alarm and missed detection probabilities. Numerical results
demonstrate the efficacy of these two algorithms.
A. Related work
The existing research on adversarial images can be divided
into two categories: attack design and attack mitigation.
1) Attack design: While there have been numerous at-
tempts to tackle deception attacks in sensor-based remote esti-
mation systems [5]–[7], the problem of design and mitigation
of adversarial attack on images to cause misclassification is
relatively new. The first paper on adversarial image generation
was reported in [8]. Since then, there have been significant
research on attack design in this setting. All these attack
schemes can be divided into two categories:
1) White box attack: Here the attacker knows the archi-
tecture, parameters, cost functions, etc of the classifier.
Hence, it is easier to design such attacks. Examples of
such attacks are given in [9], [8], [10], [11], [12], [13].
2) Black box attack: Here the adversary has access only to
the output (e.g., logits or probabilities) of the classifier
against a test input. Hence, the attacker has to probe
the classifier with many test input images in order to
estimate the sensitivity of the output with respect to the
input. One black box attack is reported in [14].
On the other hand, depending on attack goals, the attack
schemes can be divided into two categories:
1) Targeted attack: Such attacks seek to misclassify a par-
ticular class to another pre-defined class. For example,
a fruit classifier is made to classify all the apple images
as banana. Such attacks are reported in [15] and [14].
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Figure 1. Example of an adversarial image. The original image is classified as a cat. Addition of a carefully designed noise changes the same classifier’s
output to ostrich, while the visual change in the image is not significant.
2) Reliability Attack: Such attacks only seek to increase
the classification error. Such attacks have been reported
in [16], [14], [9], [11], [8].
Some popular adversarial attacks are summarized below:
• L-BFGS Attack [8]: This white box attack tries to find
a perturbation η to an image x such that the perturbed
image x′ = x + η minimizes a cost function Jθ(x, l)
(where θ is cost parameter and l is the label) of the
classifier, while η remains within some small set around
the origin to ensure small perturbation. A Lagrange
multiplier is used to relax the constraint on η, which is
found via line search.
• Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9]: Here the
perturbation is computed as η = (∇xJθ(x, l)) where
 the magnitude of perturbation. This perturbation can be
computed via backpropagation.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [13]: This is an iterative
variant of FGSM.
• CarliniWagner(L2)(CW) Attack [10]: This is simi-
lar to [8] except that: (i) [10] uses a cost function that is
different from the classifier’s cost function Jθ(·, ·), and
(ii) the optimal Lagrange multiplier is found via binary
search.
• Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [11]: This involves
applying FGSM iteratively and clipping the iterate images
to ensure that they remain close to the original image.
• Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [12]: It is a
greedy attack algorithm which selects the most important
pixels by calculating Jacobian based saliency map, and
modifies those pixels iteratively.
• Boundary Attack [14]: This is a black box attack which
starts from an adversarial point and then performs a
random walk along the decision boundary between the
adversarial and the non-adversarial regions, such that
the iterate image stays in the adversarial region but the
distance between the iterate image and the target image
is progressively minimized. This is done via rejection
sampling using a suitable proposal distribution, in order
to find progressively smaller adversarial perturbations.
2) Attack mitigation: There are two possible approaches
for defence against adversarial attack:
1) Robustness based defense: These methods seek to
classify adversarial images correctly, e.g., [17], [18].
2) Detection based defense: These methods seek to just
distinguish between adversarial and clean images; eg.,
[19], [20].
Here we describe some popular attack mitigation schemes.
The authors of [17] proposed feature denoising to improve
robustness of CNNs against adversarial images. They found
that certain architectures were good for robustness even though
they are not sufficient for accuracy improvements. However,
when combined with adversarial training, these designs could
be more robust. The authors of [19] put forth a Bayesian view
of detecting adversarial samples, claiming that the uncertainty
associated with adversarial examples is more compared to
clean ones. They used a Bayesian neural network to distin-
guish between adversarial and clean images on the basis of
uncertainty estimation.
The authors of [20] trained a PixelCNN network [21] to
differentiate between clean and adversarial examples. They
rejected adversarial samples using p-value based ranking of
PixelCNN. This scheme was able to detect several attacks
like CW (L2), Deepfool, BIM. The paper [22] observed that
there is a significant difference between the percentage of label
change due to perturbation in adversarial samples as compared
to clean ones. They designed a statistical adversary detection
algorithm called nMutant; inspired by mutation testing from
software engineering community.
The authors of [18] designed a method called network
distillation to defend DNNs against adversarial examples. The
original purpose of network distillation was the reduction of
size of DNNs by transferring knowledge from a bigger net-
work to a smaller one [23], [24]. The authors discovered that
using high-temperature softmax reduces the model’s sensitivity
towards small perturbations. This defense was tested on the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets. It was observed that network
distillation reduces the success rate of JSMA attack [12] by
0.5% and 5% respectively. However, a lot of new attacks have
been proposed since then, which defeat defensive distillation
(e.g., [25]). The paper [9] tried training an MNIST classifier
with adversarial examples (adversarial retraining approach).
A comprehensive analysis of this method on ImageNet data
set found it to be effective against one-step attacks (eg.,
FGSM), but ineffective against iterative attacks (e.g., BIM
[13]). After evaluating network distillation with adversarially
trained networks on MNIST and ImageNet, [26] found it to
be robust against white box attacks but not against black box
ones.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1) We propose a novel detection algorithm PERT for ad-
versarial attack detection. The algorithm performs PCA
on clean image data set to obtain a set of orthonormal
bases. Projection of a test image along some least
significant principal components are randomly perturbed
for detecting proximity to a decision boundary, which is
used for detection. This combination of PCA and image
perturbation in spectral domain, which is motivated by
the empirical findings in [27], is new to the literature.1
2) PERT has low computational complexity; PCA is per-
formed only once off-line.
3) We also propose an adaptive version of PERT called
APERT. The APERT algorithm declares an image to
be adversarial by checking whether a specific sequential
probability ratio exceeds an upper or a lower threshold.
The problem of minimizing the expected number of
perturbations per test image, subject to constraints on
false alarm and missed detection probabilities, is relaxed
via a pair of Lagrange multipliers. The relaxed prob-
lem is solved via simultaneous perturbation stochastic
approximation (SPSA; see [30]) to obtain the optimal
threshold values, and the optimal Lagrange multipliers
are learnt via two-timescale stochastic approximation
[31] in order to meet the constraints. The use of stochas-
tic approximation and SPSA to optimize the threshold
values are new to the signal processing literature to the
best of our knowledge. Also, the APERT algorithm has a
sound theoretical motivation which is rare in most papers
on adversarial image detection.
4) PERT and APERT are agnostic to attacker and classifier
models, which makes them attractive to many practical
applications.
5) Numerical results demonstrate high probability of attack
detection and small value for false alarm probability
under PERT and APERT against a competing algo-
rithm, and reasonably low computational complexity in
APERT.
1The paper [28] uses PCA but throws away least significant components,
thereby removing useful information along those components, possibly lead-
ing to high false alarm rate. The paper [29] showed that their attack can
break simple PCA-based defence, while our algorithm performs well against
the attack of [29] as seen later in the numerical results.
Figure 2. Cumulative explained variance versus components of PCA.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The PERT
algorithm is described in Section II. The APERT algorithm
is described in Section III. Numerical exploration of the
proposed algorithm is summarized in Section IV, followed by
the conclusion in Section V.
II. STATIC PERTURBATION BASED ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose an adversarial image detection
algorithm based on random perturbation of an image in the
spectral domain; the algorithm is called PERT. This algorithm
is motivated by the two key observations:
1) The authors of [27] found that the injected adversar-
ial noise mainly resides in least significant principal
components. Intuitively, this makes sense since injecting
noise to the most significant principal components would
lead to detection by human eye. We have applied PCA
on CIFAR-10 training data set to learn its principal
components sorted by decreasing eigenvalues; the ones
with higher eigenvalues are the most significant prin-
cipal components. CIFAR-10 data set consists of 3072
dimensional images, applying PCA on the entire data
set yields 3072 principal components. The cumulative
explained variance ratio as a function of the number
of components (in decreasing order of the eigenvalues)
is shown in Figure 2; this figure shows that most of
the variance is concentrated along the first few principal
components. Hence, least significant components do not
provide much additional information, and adversarial
perturbation of these components should not change the
image significantly.
2) Several attackers intend push the image close to the
decision boundary to fool a classifier [14]. Thus it
is possible to detect an adversarial image if we can
check whether it is close to a decision boundary or
not. Hence, we propose a new scheme for exploring the
neighborhood of a given image in spectral domain.
Hence, our algorithm performs PCA on a training data set,
and finds the principal components. When a new test image
(potentially adversarial) comes, it projects that image along
these principal components, randomly perturbs the projection
along a given number of least significant components, and
then obtains another image from this perturbed spectrum. If
the classifier yields same label for this new image and the
original test image, then it is concluded that the original image
is most likely not near a decision boundary and hence not
an adversarial; else, an alarm is raised for adversarial attack.
In fact, multiple perturbed images can be generated by this
process, and if the label of the original test image differs with
that of at least one perturbed image, an alarm is raised. The
intuition behind this is that if an image is adversarial it will
lie close to a decision boundary, and perturbation should push
it to another region, thus changing the label generated by the
classifier.
Algorithm 1: The PERT algorithm
1 Training Phase (PCA):
2 Input: Training image set
3 Output: Principal components of the data set
1) Vectorize the pixel values of all images.
2) Find the sample covariance matrix of these vectors.
3) Perform singular value decomposition (SVD) of the
sample covariance matrix.
4) Obtain the eigenvectors {Φ1,Φ2, · · · ,ΦM} arranged
from most significant components to least significant
components.
Test Phase (Perturbation based attack detection):
Initialization: Boolean result = False
Input: Input image x (vectorized), no. of purturbed
image samples to generate T , no. of coefficients
to perturb C
Output: True, if input is adversarial
False, if input is not adversarial
4 Get prediction y for input image x through classifier.
5 Compute the projections (dot products)
< x,Φ1 >,< x,Φ2 >, · · · , < x,ΦM > and vectorize
these M values as xˆ = [xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆM ].
6 for i = 1 to T do
7 Add realizations of C i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian
random variables to xˆM−C+1, xˆM−C+2, · · · , xˆM .
This will convert xˆ to xˆ′.
8 Get inverse transform of xˆ′ to get a new image x′i.
9 Get prediction y′i for image x
′
i through classifier.
10 if y not equal y′i then
11 result = True;
12 break;
13 else
14 continue;
15 end
16 end
Discussion: PERT has several advantages over most algo-
rithms in the literature:
1) PERT is basically a pre-processing algorithm for the
test image, and hence it is agnostic to the attacker and
classifier models.
2) The on-line part of PERT involves computing simple
dot products and perturbations, which have very low
complexity. PCA can be performed once off-line and
used for ever.
However, one should remember that PERT perturbs the least
significant components randomly, and hence there is no guar-
antee that a perturbation will be in the right direction to
ensure a crossover of the decision boundary. This issue can
be resolved by developing more sophisticated perturbation
methods using direction search, specifically in case some
knowledge of the decision boundaries is available to the
detector. Another option is to create many perturbations of a
test image, at the expense of more computational complexity.
However, in the next section, we will formulate the sequential
version of PERT, which will minimize the mean number of
image perturbations per image, under a budget on the missed
detection probability and false alarm probability.
III. ADAPTIVE PERTURBATION BASED ALGORITHM
In Section II, the PERT algorithm used up to a constant
T number of perturbations of the test image in the spectral
domain. However, the major drawback of PERT is that it might
be wasteful in terms of computations. If an adversarial image
is very close to the decision boundary, then small number of
perturbations might be sufficient for detection. On the other
hand, if the adversarial image is far away from a decision
boundary, then more perturbations will be required to cross
the decision boundary with high probability. Also, the PERT
algorithm only checks for a decision boundary crossover (hard
decision), while many DNNs yield a belief probability vector
for the class of a test image (soft output); this soft output
of DNNs can be used to improve detector performance and
reduce its complexity.
In this section, we propose an adaptive version of PERT
called APERT. The APERT algorithm sequentially perturbs
the test image in spectral domain. A stopping rule is used by
the pre-processing unit to decide when to stop perturbing a test
image and declare a decision (adversarial or non-adversarial);
this stopping rule is a two-threshold rule motivated by the
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT [32]), on top of the
decision boundary crossover checking. The threshold values
are optimized using the theory of stochastic approximation
[31] and SPSA [30].
A. Mathematical formulation
Let us denote the random number of perturbations used in
any adaptive technique µ based on random perturbation by N ,
and let the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection
of any randomly chosen test image under this technique be
denoted by PF (µ) and PM (µ) respectively. We seek to solve
the following constrained problem:
min
µ
Eµ(N) such that PF (µ) ≤ α, PM (µ) ≤ β (CP)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) are two constraint values.
However, (CP) can be relaxed by using two Lagrange multi-
pliers λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0 to obtain the following unconstrained
problem:
min
µ
(
Eµ(N) + λ1PF (µ) + λ2PM (µ)
)
(UP)
Let the optimal decision rule for (UP) under (λ1, λ2) be
denoted by µ∗(λ1, λ2). It is well known that, if there ex-
ists λ∗1 ≥ 0 and λ∗2 ≥ 0 such that PF (µ∗(λ∗1, λ∗2)) =
α, PM (µ
∗(λ∗1, λ
∗
2)) = β, then µ
∗(λ∗1, λ
∗
2) is an optimal so-
lution for (CP) as well.
Finding out µ∗(λ1, λ2) for a pair (λ1, λ2) is very challeng-
ing. Hence, we focus on the class of SPRT-type algorithms
instead. Let us assume that the DNN based classifier generates
a probability value against an input image; this probability is
the belief of the classifier that the image under consideration
is adversarial. Now, suppose that we sequentially perturb an
image in the spectral domain as in PERT, and feed these
perturbed images one by one to the DNN, which acts as
our classifier. Let the DNN return category wise probabilistic
distribution of the image in the form of a vector. We use these
vectors to determine qi which indicates the likelihood (not
necessarily a probability) of the i-th perturbed image being
adversarial. Motivated by SPRT, the proposed APERT algo-
rithm checks if the ratio q1q2···qk|(1−q1)(1−q2)···(1−qk)| crosses an upper
threshold B or a lower threshold A after the k-th perturbation;
an adversarial image is declared if q1q2···qk|(1−q1)(1−q2)···(1−qk)| > B,
a non-adversarial image is declared if q1q2···qk|(1−q1)(1−q2)···(1−qk)| <
A, and the algorithm continues perturbing the image if
q1q2···qk
|(1−q1)(1−q2)···(1−qk)| ∈ (A,B). In case k exceeds a pre-
determined maximum number of perturbations T without any
threshold crossing, the image is declared to be non-adversarial.
Clearly, for given (λ1, λ2), the algorithm needs to compute
the optimal threshold values A∗(λ1, λ2) and B∗(λ1, λ2) to
minimize the cost in (UP). Also, λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 need to be com-
puted to meet the constraints in (CP) with equality. APERT
uses two-timescale stochastic approximation and SPSA for
updating the Lagrange multipliers and the threshold values
in the training phase, learns the optimal parameter values, and
uses these parameter values in the test phase.
B. The SRT algorithm for image classification
Here we describe an SPRT based algorithm called sequential
ration test or SRT for classifying an image x. The algorithm
takes A,B,C, T,x, the PCA eigenvectors {Φi}1≤i≤M , and
a binary variable Q ∈ {0, 1} as input, and classifies x
as adversarial or non-adversarial. This algorithm is used as
one important component of the APERT algorithm described
later. SRT blends ideas from PERT and the standard SPRT
algorithm. However, as seen in the pseudocode of SRT, we use
a quantity qj in the threshold testing where qj ∈ (0, 1) cannot
be interpreted as a probability. Instead, qj is the normalized
value of the p-norm of the difference between outputs y and
y′j of the DNN against inputs x and its j-th perturbation
x′j . The binary variable Q is used as a switch; if Q = 1
and if the belief probability vectors y and y′j lead to two
different predicted categories, then SRT directly declares x
to be adversarial. It has been observed numerically that this
results in a better adversarial image detection probability, and
hence any test image in the proposed APERT scheme later is
classified via SRT with Q = 1.
Algorithm 2: SRT(A,B,C, T,x, {Φi}1≤i≤M , Q) algo-
rithm
Initialization: j = 1, Boolean result = False
Input: Threshold pair (A,B), number of coefficients to
perturb C, maximum number of perturbations T ,
input image x (vectorized), orthonormal basis
vectors {Φi}1≤i≤M (typically obtained from
PCA), Switch for Category change detection Q
where Q ∈ {0, 1}
Output: True, if input image is adversarial
False, if input image is not adversarial
1 Get category wise probability classification vector y for
input image x through classifier.
2 Compute the projections (dot products)
< x,Φ1 >,< x,Φ2 >, · · · , < x,ΦM > and vectorize
these M values as xˆ = [xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆM ].
3 while j ≤ T and result = False do
4 Add realizations of C i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian
random variables to xˆM−C+1, xˆM−C+2, · · · , xˆM .
This will convert xˆ to xˆ′. Get inverse transform of
xˆ′ to get a new image x′j .
5 Get category wise probability classification vector y′j
for input image x′j through classifier.
6 Get qj by taking
‖y−y′j‖p
K , where K is the dimension
of row vector y and 1 ≤ p
7 if Predicted category changed in perturbed image
and Q = 1 then
8 result = True;
9 break;
10 else if q1q2..qj|(1−q1)....(1−qj)| < A then
11 result = False;
12 break;
13 else if q1q2..qj|(1−q1)....(1−qj)| > B then
14 result = True;
15 break;
16 else
17 j = j + 1 continue;
18 end
19 end
20 return result
C. The APERT algorithm
1) The training phases: The APERT algorithm, designed
for (CP), consists of two training phases and a testing phase.
The first training phase simply runs the PCA algorithm. The
second training phase basically runs stochastic approximation
iterations to find A∗, B∗, λ∗1, λ
∗
2 so that the false alarm and
missed detection probability constraints are satisfied with
equality.
The second training phase of APERT requires three non-
negative sequences a(t), δ(t) and d(t) are chosen such that:
(i)
∑∞
t=0 a(t) =
∑∞
t=0 d(t) = ∞, (ii)
∑∞
t=0 a
2(t) < ∞,∑∞
t=0 d
2(t) < ∞, (iii) limt→∞ δ(t) = 0, (iv)
∑∞
t=0
a2(t)
δ2(t) <
∞, (v) limt→∞ d(t)a(t) = 0. The first two conditions are stan-
dard requirements for stochastic approximation. The third and
fourth conditions are required for convergence of SPSA, and
the fifth condition maintains the necessary timescale separation
explained later.
The APERT algorithm also requires θ which is the percent-
age of adversarial images among all image samples used in the
training phase II. It also maintains two iterates nclean(t) and
nadv(t) to represent the number of clean and images encoun-
tered up to the t-th training image; i.e., nclean(t)+nadv(t) = t.
Steps 5 − 13 of APERT correspond to SPSA which is
basically a stochastic gradient descent scheme with noisy
estimate of gradient, used for minimizing the objective of
(UP) over A and B for current (λ1(t), λ2(t)) iterates. SPSA
allows us to compute a noisy gradient of the objective of
(CP) by randomly and simultaneously perturbing (A(t), B(t))
in two opposite directions and obtaining the noisy estimate
of gradient from the difference in the objective function
evaluated at these two perturbed values; this allows us to avoid
coordinate-wise perturbation in gradient estimation. In has to
be noted that, the cost to be optimized by SPSA has to be
obtained from SRT. The A(t) and B(t) iterates are projected
onto non-overlapping compact intervals [Amin, Amax] and
[Bmin, Bmax] (with Amax < Bmin) to ensure boundedness.
Steps 14 − 15 are used to find λ∗1 and λ∗2 via stochastic
approximation in a slower timescale. In has to be noted that,
since limt→∞
d(t)
a(t) = 0, we have a two-timescale stochastic ap-
proximation [31] where the Lagrange multipliers are updated
in a slower timescale and the threshold values are updated via
SPSA in a faster timescale. The faster timescale iterates view
the slower timescale iterates as quasi-static, while the slower-
timescale iterates view the faster timescale iterates as almost
equilibriated; as if, the slower timescale iterates vary in an
outer loop and the faster timescale iterates vary in an inner
loop. It has to be noted that, though standard two-timescale
stochastic approximation theory guarantees some convergence
under suitable conditions [31], here we cannot provide any
convergence guarantee of the iterates due to the lack of
established statistical properties of the images. It is also noted
that, λ1(t) and λ2(t) are updated at different time instants; this
corresponds to asynchronous stochastic approximation [31].
The λ1(t) and λ2(t) iterates are projected onto [0,∞) to
ensure non-negativity. Intuitively, if a false alarm is observed,
the cost of false alarm, λ1(t) is increased. Similarly, if a
missed detection is observed, then the cost of missed detection,
λ2(t), is increased, else it is decreased. Ideally, the goal is to
reach to a pair (λ∗1, λ
∗
2) so that the constraints in (CP) are met
with equality, through we do not have any formal convergence
proof.
2) Testing phase: The testing phase just uses SRT with
Q = 1 for any test image. Since Q = 1, a test image
bypasses the threshold testing and is declared adversarial, in
case the random perturbation results in predicted category
change of the test image. It has been numerically observed
(see Section IV) that this results in a small increase in false
alarm rate but a high increase in adversarial image detection
rate compared to Q = 0. However, one has the liberty to
avoid this and only use the threshold test in SRT by setting
Q = 0. Alternatively, one can set a slightly smaller value of α
in APERT with Q = 1 in order to compensate for the increase
in false alarm.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Performance of PERT
We evaluated our proposed algorithm on CIFAR-10 data
set and the classifier of [11] implemented in a challenge to
explore adversarial robustness of neural networks (see [33]).2
Each image in CIFAR-10 has 32×32 pixels, where each pixel
has three channels: red, green, blue. Hence, PCA provides
M = 32× 32× 3 = 3072 orthonormal basis vectors. CIFAR-
10 has 60000 images, out of which 50000 images were used
for PCA based training and rest of the images were used for
evaluating the performance of the algorithm.
Table I shows the variation of detection probability (per-
centage of detected adversarial images) for adversarial images
generated using various attacks, for number of components
C = 1000 and various values for maximum possible number
of samples T (number of perturbations for a given image). Due
to huge computational requirement in generating adversarial
images via black box attack, we have considered only four
white box attacks. It is evident that the attack detection
probability (percentage) increases with T ; this is intuitive since
larger T results in a higher probability of decision boundary
crossover if an adversarial image is perturbed. The second
column of Table I denotes the percentage of clean images
that were declared to be adversarial by our algorithm, i.e., it
contains the false alarm probabilities which also increase with
T . However, we observe that our pre-processing algorithm
achieves very low false alarm probability and high attack
detection probability under these four popular white box
attacks. This conclusion is further reinforced in Table II, which
shows the variation in detection performance with varying
C, for T = 10 and T = 20. It is to be noted that the
detection probability under the detection algorithm of [22] are
56.7% and 72.9% for CW (L2) and FGSM attacks; clearly
our detection algorithm outperforms [22] while having low
computation. The last column of Table II suggests that there is
an optimal value of C, since perturbation along more principal
components may increase the decision boundary crossover
probability but at the same time can modify the information
along some most significant components as well.
B. Performance of APERT
For APERT, we initialize A(0) = 10−10, B(0) =
0.5, λ1(0) = λ2(0) = 10, and choose step sizes a(t) =
O( 1t0.7 ), d(t) = O(
1
t ), δ(t) = O(
1
t0.1 ). The Foolbox library
was used to craft adversarial examples. The classification
neural network is taken from [33]
2-norm is used to obtain the qi values since it was observed
that 2-norm outperforms 1-norm. In the training process, 50%
of the training images were clean and 50% images were
adversarial.
2Codes for our numerical experiments are available in [34] and [35].
We used Foolbox library [36] for generating adversarial images. PCA was
performed using Scikit-learn [37] library in Python; this library allows us to
customize the computational complexity and accuracy in PCA.
Algorithm 3: The APERT algorithm
1 Training Phase I (PCA):
2 Input: Training image set
3 Output: Principal components of the data set
1) Vectorize the pixel values of all images.
2) Find the sample covariance matrix of these vectors.
3) Perform singular value decomposition (SVD) of the sample
covariance matrix.
4) Obtain the eigenvectors {Φ1,Φ2, · · · ,ΦM} arranged from
most significant components to least significant components.
Training Phase II (Determining A and B)
Initialization: nclean(0) = nadv(0) = 0, non-negative
0 < A(0) < B(0), λ1(0), λ2(0)
Input: θ, training image set with each image in vectorized
form, number of training images nmax, no. of
coefficients to perturb C, α, β, sequences
{a(t), δ(t), d(t)}t≥0, maximum number of perturbations
Nmax, range of accepted values of the thresholds
[Amin, Amax], [Bmin, Bmax] such that
0 < Amin < Amax < Bmin < Bmax
Output: Final Values of (A∗, B∗) (and also λ∗1 and λ∗2 which
are not used in the test phase)
4 for t← 0 to nmax − 1 do
5 Randomly generate b1(t) ∈ {−1, 1} and b2(t) ∈ {−1, 1}
with probability 0.5
6 Compute A′(t) = A(t) + δ(t)b1(t) and
B′(t) = B(t) + δ(t)b2(t), similarly
A′′(t) = A(t)− δ(t)b1(t) and B′′(t) = B(t)− δ(t)b2(t).
7 Randomly pick the training image xt (can be adversarial
with probability θ/100)
8 If image is actually adversarial then
nadv(t) = nadv(t− 1) + 1, If image is clean then
nclean(t) = nclean(t− 1) + 1
9 Define I{miss} and I{falsealarm} as an indicator of
missed detection and false alarm respectively by SRT
algorithm and I{cleanimage} as indicator of a non
adversarial image
10 Compute cost
c′(t) = N ′(t) + λ1(t)I{falsealarm}+ λ2(t)I{miss}
by using SRT (A′(t), B′(t), C, T,xt, {Φi}1≤i≤M , 0)
11 Compute cost
c′′(t) = N ′′(t) + λ1(t)I{falsealarm}+ λ2(t)I{miss}
by using SRT (A′′(t), B′′(t), C, T,xt, {Φi}1≤i≤M , 0)
12 Update A(t+ 1) = [A(t)− a(t)× c′(t)−c′′(t)
2b1(t)δ(t)
] and then
project A(t+ 1) on [Amin, Amax]
13 Update B(t+ 1) = [B(t)− a(t)× c′(t)−c′′(t)
2b2(t)δ(t)
] and then
project B(t+ 1) on [Bmin, Bmax]
14 Again Determine I{falsealarm} and I{miss} from
SRT(A(t+ 1), B(t+ 1), C, T,xt, {Φi}1≤i≤M , 0)
15 Update λ1(t+ 1) = [λ1(t) +
I{cleanimage}d(nclean(t))× (I{falsealarm} − α)]∞0 ,
λ2(t+1) = [λ2(t) + I{adversarialimage}d(nadv(t))×
(I{miss} − β)]∞0
16 end
17 return (A∗ .= A(nmax), B∗
.
= B(nmax))
18 Testing Phase:
Initialization: Boolean result = False
Input: Input image x (vectorized), maximum number of
perturbed image samples to generate T , no. of
coefficients to perturb C, lower threshold A, upper
threshold B
Output: True, if input image is adversarial
False, if input image is not adversarial
19 return SRT(A,B,C, T,x, {Φi}1≤i≤M , 1)
Table I
DETECTION AND FALSE ALARM PERFORMANCE OF PERT ALGORITHM
FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF T .
No. of Percentage Detection (%)
Samples T Cleana FGSM L-BFGS PGD CW(L2)
05 1.2 50.02 89.16 55.03 96.47
10 1.5 63.53 92.50 65.08 98.23
15 1.7 69.41 93.33 67.45 99.41
20 1.9 73.53 95.03 71.01 99.41
25 1.9 75.29 95.03 75.14 100.00
aClean images that are detected as adversarial
Table II
DETECTION AND FALSE ALARM PERFORMANCE OF PERT ALGORITHM
FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF C .
No. of Percentage Detection (%)
Coefficients C Cleana FGSM L-BFGS PGD CW(L2)
No. of Samples(T ): 10
0500 1.20 58.23 90.83 57.40 95.90
1000 1.50 69.41 93.33 60.95 95.45
1500 2.10 64.11 91.67 61.53 95.00
No. of Samples(T ): 20
0500 1.20 68.23 93.33 68.05 95.90
1000 1.90 74.11 94.16 70.41 95.90
1500 2.50 71.18 95.00 71.00 95.00
aClean images that are detected as adversarial
Though there is no theoretical convergence guarantee for
APERT, we have numerically observed convergence of A(t),
B(t), λ1(t) and λ2(t)
1) Computational complexity of PERT and APERT: We
note that, a major source of computational complexity in
PERT and APERT is perturbing an image and passing it
through a classifier. In Table III and Table IV, we numerically
compare the mean number of perturbations required for PERT
and APERT under Q = 1 and Q = 0 respectively. The
classification neural network was taken from [33].
Table III and Table IV show that the APERT algorithm
requires much less perturbations compared to PERT for almost
similar detection performance, for various attack algorithms
and various test images that result in false alarm, adversarial
image detection, missed detection and (correctly) clean image
detection. It is also noted that, for the images resulting in
missed detection and clean image detection, PERT has to
exhaust all T = 25 perturbation options before stopping.
As a result, the mean number of perturbations in APERT
becomes significantly smaller than PERT; see Table V. The
key reason behind smaller number of perturbations in APERT
is the fact that APERT uses a doubly-threshold stopping rule
motivated by the popular SPRT algorithm in detection theory.
It is also observed that APERT with Q = 1 in the testing phase
has slightly lower computaional complexity than APERT with
Q = 0, since APERT with Q = 1 has an additional flexibility
of stopping the perturbation if there is a change in predicted
category.
We also implemented a Gaussian process regression based
detector (GPRBD) from [38] (not sequential in nature) which
uses the neural network classifier of [33], tested it against
our adversarial examples, and compared its runtime against
that of PERT and APERT equipped with the neural network
Figure 3. ROC plot comparison of PERT, APERT with Q = 0, APERT with Q = 1 and GPRBD detection algorithms for various attack schemes. Top left:
CW attack. Top right: LBFGS attack. Bottom left: FGSM attack. Bottom right: PGD attack.
Table III
MEAN NUMBER OF SAMPLES GENERATED FOR PERT AND APERT
ALGORITHM.HERE PERT AND APERT’S PARAMETER WERE SET IN A
WAY THAT THEY BRING THEIR FALSE ALARM PERFORMANCE CLOSEST TO
EACH OTHER FOR Q = 1 IN TESTING PHASE FOR APERT
Attack Mean Number of Samples Generated
Type False Detected Missed Detected
Alarm Adversarial Detection Clean
PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT
CW (L2) 9.76 1.17 1.19 1.02 25 4.09 25 2.37
LBFGS 11.86 1.42 1.87 1.07 25 4.97 25 3.41
FGSM 1.68 1.08 4.97 1.07 25 5.08 25 2.97
PGD 14.12 1.15 4.87 1.41 25 5.47 25 3.03
Attack Corresponding Detection performance %
Type False Detected Missed Detected
Alarm Probability Adversarial Probability Detection Probability Clean Probability
PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT
CW (L2) 4.56 5.12 97.10 98.10 2.90 1.90 95.44 94.88
LBFGS 4.85 5.24 96.3 94.35 3.7 5.65 95.15 94.76
FGSM 5.41 5.88 79.31 87.64 20.69 12.36 94.59 94.12
PGD 4.01 4.51 83.99 84.45 16.01 15.55 95.99 95.49
classifier of [33]. These experiments were run under the same
colab runtime environment, in a single session. The runtine
specifications are- CPU Model name: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
@ 2.30GHz, Socket(s): 1, Core(s) per socket: 1, Thread(s)
per core: 2, L3 cache: 46080K, CPU MHz: 2300.000, RAM
available: 12.4 GB, Disk Space Available: 71 GB. Table VI
shows that, APERT has significantly smaller runtime than
PERT as expected, and slightly larger runtime than GPRBD.
Also, APERT with Q = 1 has smaller runtime than Q = 0.
Table IV
MEAN NUMBER OF SAMPLES GENERATED FOR PERT AND APERT
ALGORITHM.HERE APERT’S PARAMETERS WERE SET IN A WAY THAT
THEY BRING THE FALSE ALARM PERFORMANCE OF APERT CLOSEST TO
CORRESPONDING PERT’S FALSE ALARM PERFORMANCE IN TABLE III
FOR Q = 0 IN TESTING PHASE FOR APERT
Attack Mean Number of Samples Generated
Type False Detected Missed Detected
Alarm Adversarial Detection Clean
PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT
CW (L2) 9.76 1.0 1.19 1.0 25 6.11 25 2.96
LBFGS 11.86 1.02 1.87 1.0 25 6.07 25 3.28
FGSM 1.68 1.05 4.97 1.02 25 6.11 25 3.10
PGD 14.12 1.07 4.87 1.21 25 6.037 25 3.05
Attack Corresponding Detection performance %
Type False Detected Missed Detected
Alarm Probability Adversarial Probability Detection Probability Clean Probability
PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT PERT APERT
CW (L2) 4.56 5.45 97.10 84.09 2.90 15.91 95.44 94.55
LBFGS 4.85 5.97 96.3 80.57 3.7 19.43 95.15 94.03
FGSM 5.41 6.47 79.31 65.29 20.69 34.71 94.59 93.53
PGD 4.01 5.12 83.99 65.49 16.01 34.51 95.99 94.88
2) Performance of PERT and APERT: In Figure 3, we
compare the ROC (receiver operating characteristic) plots of
PERT, APERT and GPRBD algorithms, all implemented with
the same neural network classifier of [33]. The Gaussian model
used for GPRBD was implemented using [39] with the Kernel
parameters set as follows: input dimensions = 10, variance =
1 and length scale = 0.01 as in [38]. The Gaussian model
parameter optimization was done using LBFGS with max
Table V
MEAN NUMBER OF SAMPLES GENERATED FOR T = 25 AND C = 1000 FOR
APERT AND PERT ALGORITHM OVER A DATASET WITH 50%
AVERSARIAL IMAGES AND 50% CLEAN IMAGES
Mean Number of Samples Generated
Attack PERT APERT
Q = 1 Q = 0
CW (L2) 13.3 1.85 1.92
LBFGS 13.5 2.19 2.19
FGSM 15.5 2.14 2.56
PGD 14.48 2.20 2.57
Table VI
PERFORMANCE OF OUR IMPLEMENTATION OF GAUSSIAN PROCESS
REGRESSION BASED DETECTOR(GPRBD) VS OUR APERT ALGORITHM
FOR T = 25, C = 1000
Attack Average Time Taken per Image (seconds)
GPRBD APERT PERT
Q = 1 Q = 0
CW (L2) 0.2829 0.6074 0.6398 4.1257
LBFGS 0.2560 0.6982 0.7059 4.7895
FGSM 0.2728 0.6372 0.7801 4.6421
PGD 0.2694 0.6475 0.7789 4.4216
iterations = 1000. It is obvious from Figure 3 that, for the
same false alarm probability, APERT has higher or almost
same attack detection rate compared to PERT. Also, APERT
and PERT significantly outperform GPRBD. Hence, APERT
yields a good compromise between ROC performance and
computational complexity. It is also observed that APERT with
Q = 1 always has a better ROC curve than APERT with Q = 0
in the testing phase.
Table VII and Table VIII show that the false alarm probabil-
ity and attack detection probability of APERT increases with
C for a fixed T , for both Q = 1 and Q = 0. As C increases,
more least significant components are perturbed in the spectral
domain, resulting in a higher probability of decision boundary
crossover.
Table VII
VARIATION IN PERFORMANCE OF APERT WITH VALUES OF C USING
SECOND NORM FOR T = 10 AND T = 20 FOR Q = 1 IN TESTING PHASE
Attack Percentage Detection(%)
Type C = 500 C = 1000 C = 1500
False Detection False Detection False Detection
Alarm Probability Alarm Probability Alarm Probability
No. of Samples(T ): 10
CW (L2) 5.0 96.81 8.18 98.18 11.36 99.09
LBFGS 4.16 94.16 10.0 93.33 12.5 97.5
FGSM 2.94 62.35 4.70 80.0 5.88 94.70
PGD 2.36 63.9 5.91 77.54 7.10 88.16
No. of Samples(T ): 20
CW (L2) 1.01 95.46 5.45 96.81 6.36 98.18
LBFGS 2.5 90.83 9.16 94.16 15.0 96.66
FGSM 2.94 57.64 4.70 79.41 7.64 90.58
PGD 1.77 60.9 4.14 79.88 9.46 88.757
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed two novel pre-processing
schemes for detection of adversarial images, via a combination
of PCA-based spectral decomposition, random perturbation,
Table VIII
VARIATION IN PERFORMANCE OF APERT WITH VALUES OF C USING
SECOND NORM FOR T = 10 AND T = 20, FOR Q = 0 IN TESTING PHASE
Attack Percentage Detection(%)
Type C = 500 C = 1000 C = 1500
False Detection False Detection False Detection
Alarm Probability Alarm Probability Alarm Probability
No. of Samples(T ): 10
CW (L2) 3.18 89.09 8.18 91.81 12.72 93.63
LBFGS 6.66 81.66 15.0 85.83 19.16 96.66
FGSM 2.35 50.0 7.05 67.65 8.23 85.88
PGD 2.36 39.05 6.5 68.63 9.46 82.84
No. of Samples(T ): 20
CW (L2) 5.45 84.09 8.18 91.81 11.81 93.18
LBFGS 7.5 85.0 12.5 93.33 17.5 94.166
FGSM 3.529 44.70 6.47 65.29 7.05 83.53
PGD 2.95 40.82 7.10 67.45 10.0 85.21
SPSA and two-timescale stochastic approximation. The pro-
posed schemes have reasonably low computational complexity
and are agnostic to attacker and classifier models. Numerical
results on detection and false alarm probabilities demonstrate
the efficacy of the proposed algorithms, despite having low
computational complexity. We will extend this work for de-
tection of black box attacks in our future research endeavour.
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